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ABSTRACT 
The Persian Gulf region is the single largest source of fossil fuels in the world, which 
emphasizes its importance as the most strategically important waterway in the world. A 
bridge between East and West, the region facilitates contact between nations by 
providing energy and power through oil and gas exports to the industrial world at large. 
Countries bordering the shores of the Persian Gulf therefore play a vital role in 
maintaining balance of power and world peace through bilateral relations and beyond.  
Bahrain’s journey until the middle of twentieth century has been more 
adventurous due to its small size and strategic central location, which served as an 
invitation to foreign powers, rulers and regional empires to exercise their own influence 
whenever they chose to do so. Oil-rich Iran, with the stature of an empire on the other 
hand, has been more stable throughout.  
The differences between these two countries lies in ethnic makeup of the two 
nations, which is the bone of contention between the two neighbors. This thesis explores 
relationship and interaction between modern-day Kingdom of Bahrain and Islamic 
Republic of Iran, two vitally important countries, by tracing their background and cultural 
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A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In the context of Bahrain-Iran relations it would be appropriate to review the body 
politics of both countries with a perspective encompassing their past history, with 
emphasis on major events of the past 300 years that lead up to the present times. 
The Islands of Bahrain constitute an archipelago of 33 islands with an area of only 
687 square kilometers that are located off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia in the middle 
south of the Persian Gulf.1 The word Bahrain, meaning “Two Seas,” refers to the unique 
fresh water springs that sprout within the salt-water seabed surrounding its coasts. As far 
back as 2000 BC, the area remained an important staging post, attracting regional traders, 
foreigners and settlers to its abundant fresh waters, friendly shores, fertile date groves and 
coastal hatcheries of natural pearls. Civilizations flourished and for centuries it was ruled 
by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Persians and finally by Muslim Arabs, who 
continue to be the rulers until today. 
 
Figure 1.   The Persian Gulf2 
1Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and Its Heritage (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 1.  
2 Wikipedia, s.v. “Persian Gulf,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Persian_Gulf_map.png, accessed 
November 20, 2011. 
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Geographically Bahrain occupies a strategic location within the Persian Gulf but 
due to its small size, in the past, its neighbors like Iran and even other larger tribes of 
eastern Saudi Arabia have sought to control the island. 
Since the propagation of Islam as a religion within and beyond the Arabian 
peninsula some 1400 years ago, the tribes in Bahrain were among the first to embrace 
Islam, which to date is the religion of the state. In comparison to Iran, it is tiny on every 
scale, literally a dot when viewed on the worlds map, yet it is a sovereign state and an 
independent country in every respect with its individual identity within the comity of 
United Nations of the world. 
On the other hand, Iran occupies Persian Gulf and presently encompasses largest 
territory amongst mideastern countries. With a population of 69 million people and 
covering an area of 1.6 million square kilometers it is a goliath of a country in 
comparison with Bahrain.3 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Middle East4 
3Ervand Ibrahim, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5−6. 
4“Middle East,” http://www.iranchamber.com/history/historic_periods.php, accessed Nov 20, 2011. 
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Once a major empire and civilization within itself, the rich history of Persia as it 
was once called, dates back to 2500 BC. It started with the Elamite Empire and continued 
through Median and Achamaemenid empires up to Sassnid Empire, when, in 642 AD, the 
Islamic forces in times of Caliph Omar Bin Alkhitab conquered Iran and laid the 
foundations of the Muslim era, which through subsequent rulers, dynasties and 
revolutions continue until today. 
B. GREAT ISLAMIC DIVIDE 
In order to grasp the nature of conflict as it presently exists between Iran and 
Bahrain in particular and Iran and between its erstwhile Arabian neighbor countries in 
general, it would be helpful to understand and trace the history of the “Great Islamic 
Divide” that lies at the very heart of the conflict and seeds of which were sown in very 
early stages of Islamic rule in the Arabian peninsula. 
This dichotomy refers back to the division of the religion of Islam into its two 
main sects, namely Sunnis and Shias that resulted following soon after the death of 
Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD. The minority group of followers, favoring the succession 
of Ali Bin Abi Talib (Prophet Mohammed’s first cousin) as the rightful Caliph, became 
to be known as “Shias” (Derived from the Arabic phrase “Shi’at ‘Ali,” which literally 
means “Party of Ali”). They believed that the political and spiritual leadership of all 
Muslims was the sole responsibility of Prophet Mohammed’s very own family and as 
such Ali and his male successors (later referred to as Imams by the Shias) were the 
rightful Caliphs to rule and guide all Muslims. However, in practice, this did not happen 
as the belief was in contrast with the thinking professed by the majority of Sunni 
followers who did not believe that the Prophet had selected Ali to serve in that role.5 This 
conflict of ideas resulted in separating the two sects in two distinct groups, such that with 
the passage of time, Shias perpetrated the doctrine of Twelve Imams or “Twelver” as 
commonly known, as the fundamental doctrine of their branch of Islam, now well known 
as Shia‘ism. Over centuries their numbers increased, through migrations and conquests 
they adopted new homelands and territories. Today, Shi’as currently constitute 
5 Ardisher Nausheed, Current Affairs-Iran and Neighbors (New York: Pegasus 2005), 74−75. 
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approximately 15% of the global Muslim population of 1.5 billion. These days most Shia 
Muslims live in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Pakistan.6 
Iran constitutes the largest majority of Shia Muslims with 80% of its population, 
while Bahrain’s Shia population hovers in the range of 65–70 percent.7 
It is also interesting to note that Iran was not always the bastion of the Shia branch 
of Islam. Prior to the advent of Safavid Empire (1502–1736), Sunnis were predominant 
amongst Iran’s populace.8 Bahrain has never been ruled by Iran, but Iran has long held 
claims to the allegiance of Bahrain’s Shi’ite majority. There is a complicated history to 
this relationship. Since the present day minority Sunni tribe of Al-Khalifa came into 
prominence in 1783, they had been paying tributes and protection monies to Iranian 
coastal chiefs/governors. This practice ceased somewhere in the middle of the nineteenth 
century just as the British influence grew in the Arabian Gulf.9 
A detailed study of the modern history of both countries will follow. This history 
will illustrate the obvious contrast in the leadership and governance pattern based on 
opposite scales of Islamic jurisprudence. It will also summarize the different experiences 
of each state and analyze the roots of the dispute between both states. Each is skeptical of 
other’s approach, be it politics, economic relations or efforts at furthering bilateral ties. It 
is for this reason that Bahrain, with its tiny size and with zero depth of defense, considers 
itself to be venerable and no match for Iran, should it (Iran) decide to opt for hostilities 
aimed against Bahrain. It is for this reason alone that Bahrain is hugely dependent upon 
its western allies in the region for providing safeguards for the preservation of its 
territorial integrity. The formulation of a group of Arabian countries saddling the Persian 
Gulf region into an economic and military alliance called the Gulf Consultative Council 
6 Iran Chamber Society, “History of Iran: Islamic conquest,” http://www.iranchamber.com/history/
islamic_conquest/islamic_conquest.php, accessed Aug 16, 2011. 
7 Christopher Blanchard, “Islam: Sunnis and Shi’ites” CRS Report RS21745 (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
78715.pdf, accessed July 5, 2011. 
8 Monica Gronke, Iran: A Short History: From Islamization to the Present (New Jersey: Markus 
Wiener Publishers, 2008), 90. 
9 Charles Issawi, Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), 
38–40. 
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or GCC, was the direct result of joint fears emanating from Iran’s hostile perspective as 
viewed immediately after the 1979 AD Iranian revolution.10 
C. BONE OF CONTENTION AND RESULTING FEARS 
With its majority Shia population, Bahrain’s minority Sunni rulers are constantly 
under pressure and fearful of a situation where present-day Iran could stir up civil 
disturbances through covert activities perpetrated through its Shia sympathizers within 
Bahrain. Indeed this has been the pattern during the past thirty years ever since the fall of 
Shah of Iran’s regime in 1979 AD. For example in 1981 AD, coup attempts by Shia 
dissidents (later squashed by Bahraini authorities) and again serious civil disturbances in 
1996 AD, which led to the arrest of a number of Shia dissident leaders who were 
subsequently exiled. Such disturbances, though at a reduced scale, are still continuing 
sporadically, keeping Bahrain’s expatriate security services at full alert.11  
This backdrop plus Iran’s growing military capability, notwithstanding its 
relentless pursuit of achieving indigenous nuclear capability, presents a real challenge 
and is a source of concern not only for Bahrain but also for Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates (U.A.E), and Saudi Arabia which all are wary of Iran’s current policies. In 
recent times the situation has been further complicated due to a regular barrage of what is 
often termed as “irresponsible statements” of Iran’s leaders, by the world leaders or 
media in general. For example President Ahmadinejad (The current fire brand President 
of Iran)’s call for Israel to be “wiped off the map” in a 27 October 2005 speech in Tehran 
was viewed as irrational by many world leaders.12 
In the past 100 years, Iran’s repeated territorial claims on Bahrain have been 
repudiated by regional powers and even by United Nations. The latest of these claims 
came in July 2007 AD, where an editorial published in Iran’s influential Kayhan daily 
and calling Bahrain “a province of Iran,” sparked considerable tension within the region. 
10 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International,1994), 105−108. 
11 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of Middle East (UK: Manchester United Press, 
2003), 194.  
12 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “Israel must be wiped off the Map: Speech” Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad_and_Israel, accessed July 16, 2011. 
 5 
                                                 
“The Public demand in Bahrain is the reunification of this province with its motherland, 
the Islamic Iran,” wrote13 its author Mr. Hassan Shariatmadari, who at that time was the 
advisor to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei. The Iranian foreign office did say that such 
a statement was not the official policy and was an individual’s view-point only, yet the 
damage was done, raising doubts and discontent amongst Bahraini leadership. From 
Bahrain’s perspective, such a scenario poses a problem of insecurity and an agonizing 
anxiety and fear for its administration with concern that the Shia majority population in 
Bahrain can be targeted and influenced by Iran’s Shia clerical authority to rise at any time 
in reprisal to certain Governmental policy that they may not like. To mitigate such 
feelings and improve relations all around Bahrain (since 2002 AD referred to as Kingdom 
of Bahrain, and led by its sovereign King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa) has started a reform 
program, which is aimed at providing economic incentives, concessions and 
compromises including the release and return of Shia political detainees from exile. As a 
result there has been improvement in the political circumstances of the Shia population in 
Bahrain. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that Iran will not succeed in its claims in 
annexing Bahrain, yet the probability of causing security damage is real and does exist. 
The dangers to Bahrain would become more acute if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. In 
this eventuality, Iran could conceivably attempt to coerce Bahrain to compromise on its 
independence and cooperate with Iran at the expense of its normal policy preferences. 
Close proximity of the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushair on the eastern coast of the 
Persian Gulf is therefore considered a source of threat to the environment.14 Iran so far is 
continuing to stake a hardened approach in negotiations on this issue with U.N. and other 
Western countries and has threatened to retaliate against the Gulf States if they allowed 
United States or any other western country to use their territory as a base for strike 
against Iranian nuclear facilities. This is a matter of serious concern as Bahrain already 
13 Jonathan D. Halevi, Iran’s Renewed Threats Take Over the Gulf Arab States (Jerusalem Centre for 
Public Affairs, 2007) vol. 7, no. 11. 
14 Khlopkov, Anton, Iran Breakthrough for the Russian Nuclear Industry, Moscow Defense Brief 
(Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010), 19. 
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hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and has been doing so for the past 60 years. In an 
ensuing regional conflict Bahrain will be in direct line of fire and quite vulnerable to 
Iranian military reaction. In all probability, should this scenario really gets enacted, the 
majority Shia population in Bahrain will not stay calm and the Sunni led Bahraini 
government will then face internal and external threats that it might find hard to cope 
with. 
Consequently, Bahrain and the rest of Gulf States are more or less forced by Iran 
not to support any military option against it, despite the threat to regional peace. 
Regardless, on its part, Bahrain will continue to search for effective strategies that can be 
implemented to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity against one of the largest 
and most powerful states in the Persian Gulf region. 
The ensuing chapters summarize the modern historical make up of Bahrain and 
Iran (Presently referred to as Islamic Republic of Iran since its 1979 AD revolution), 
leading up to the modern times of 21st century where both countries being responsible 
members of the international community will have to find ways to live peacefully for the 
























II. MODERN BAHRAIN: THE JOURNEY 
A. A BRIEF SURVEY 
In recent times Persian Gulf region has emerged as the single largest source of 
fossil fuels for the world, which emphasizes its importance as the most strategic 
waterway in the world. A bridge between East and West, the Persian Gulf facilitates 
contact between Asia, Africa, Europe and Americas by providing energy and power 
through oil and gas exports to the industrial world at large. It is for this reason alone that 
today, countries bordering the shores of Persian Gulf, play such vital role in maintaining 
a balance of power and world peace through bilateral relations and beyond. 
The Persian Gulf abounds in islands and one of the most important of them are 
the Islands of Bahrain lying between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the west and 
northwest, Persian Gulf waters in the north, Qatar and Iran in the east. Bahrain occupies a 
central spot within the Gulf region. Throughout history, this strategic location 
accentuated by its abundant sweet water sources, variety of agricultural food and 
lucrative pearl- banks attracted maritime travelers and sailors to stop by and replenish 
their hordes. This was also the reason, which led invaders and colonists to impose their 
will and fight for its control since earliest of time. 
B. ISLAMIC RULE 
At the time of advent of Islam in 7th century, Bahrain was rich in agricultural 
wealth, with fertile soil and plentiful water resources located along its coast. It was called 
the Province of Bahrain, and the Arab residents were descendants of the Arab tribe Bani 
Abd Al-Qais. This larger Bahrain comprised three regional areas: Hajar (present day Al-
Hasa in Saudi Arabia), Al-Khatt (present day Al-Qatif in Saudi Arabia) and Awal 
(present day Bahrain). As noted by Al-Blezeri and others, the population comprised 
mostly of Arab tribes who embraced the nascent religion during the life of Prophet 
Mohammed itself.15 The area substantiated and grew in influence during the periods of 
15 Al Blazerri, Futooh Al Buldan (New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2002), 106−107. 
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Caliph Omar Bin Alkhitab and remained a base for Islamic eastern conquests during the 
periods of reign of Abbassid and Omayyad Caliphates.  
The beginning of 10th Century AD witnessed a rebellion of the Messianic Ismailia 
sect, which actually originated in Kufa (In present day Iraq) through what was termed as 
the “Revolution of Qaramita.” They took over the city of Hajr, Bahrain’s capital at that 
time, with an aim to create a utopian society through plunder and loot. They practiced 
repression and carried out a brutal massacre of pilgrim caravans returning from Mecca on 
regular basis. Some scholars have termed this period as “Century of Terrorism”16 as the 
Qamartians remained the most dominant power in the Persian Gulf controlling the coast 
of Oman and even collected tribute from Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. In 976 AD they 
were, however, defeated in a battle by the Abbasids and gradually their powered waned 
and Bahrain broke away in 1058 AD under the leadership of Abd Al-Buhlul who 
reestablished orthodox Islam on the Islands.17  This period was then followed by the 
ascendancy to power of the Ayuni state in Bahrain which was established 1074 AD and 
continued until 1238 AD.18 After the Ayonis, Bahrain had two sets of rulers who each 
lasted about 150 years: first the Bani Afsoor and then the Bani Al-Jabur. This was a 
period of chronic instability with local disputes allowing various Persian-based Arab 
Kingdoms based in Qais, Qishm and Hormuz to involve themselves in Bahrain’s 
affairs.19 
C. THE PORTUGUESE INVASION 
The 15th century AD was marked by several major events, which brought about 
great changes in the history of the world. In the east, the Ottoman Turks won sweeping 
victories on the soil of Anatolia while they also conquered Constantinople in 1453 AD. In 
the West, the Arab rule ended in Spain, while 1492 AD saw the discovery of Americas 
16 Al-Juburi, Juburi, History of Islamic Philosophy – With view of Greek philosophy and early history 
of Islam (New York: Bright Pen, 2004), 172. 
17 John Joseph Saunders, History of medieval Islam (New York: Taylor & Francis Course Content 
Delivery, 1978), 130. 
18 Clifford Boswort, The New Islamic Dynasties: A Genealogical and Chronological Manual (UK: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 95.  
19 Curtis E. Larson, Life and Land Use on the Bahrain Islands: The Geo-archaeology of an Ancient 
Society (Illinois: University Of Chicago Press, 1984), 66. 
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through Christopher Columbus. In 1498 AD Vasco De Gama of Portugal undertook a 
voyage along the western coast of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope towards 
India. This voyage marked the entry of Europeans into waters east of Africa and Indian 
Ocean threatening the Persian Gulf and Red Sea trade routes, which were otherwise 
secured by the Islamic states within the region. The Portuguese spearheaded this new 
Colonial onslaught.20 Considering themselves as soldiers of the Crusades, they began by 
colonizing western Indian coastal areas such as Goa and Kutch, and once established, 
they successfully launched various invasions into the Persian Gulf and Red sea port 
regions to establish control on these lucrative maritime trade routes.21 The Kingdom of 
Harmuz was their first target. 
The Portuguese had a distinct advantage over their Arab adversaries as they had 
under their belt a regular naval force which was well equipped—especially with artillery 
—and so it was easy for them to defeat and force the Kingdom of Harmuz to recognize 
the authority of the Portuguese crown. By 1521 AD, Bahrain, due to its strategic location 
in the center of the Persian Gulf, was also the focus of Portuguese attention as they 
prepared another naval expedition to destroy the opposition of Bahrain by occupying it 
and liquidating the state of Al-Jabur which had become a threat to their influence through 
the popular reputation that the Bahraini King Muqrin Al-Jaboor enjoyed. The Portuguese 
however had an overwhelming superiority in firepower, and though the Bahraini forces 
provided a stiff resistance, they could not match the invaders, who were then able to 
establish their control over the island. The island of Bahrain was thus occupied and 
pillaged and its ships were set on fire.22 In this manner the Portuguese through cruel 
treatments and terror tactics continued to be the undisputed rulers of these waters for first 
three decades of the sixteenth century.  
The Portuguese rule though, did not last very long. The people of the Persian Gulf 
region were resolved to end the plunder of their own wealth and control over their 
20 Ahmed Al Anani, The Portuguese in Bahrain and Surrounding Areas (Manama: Al Watheeqa no. 
1, 1984), 77.  
21 Ibid., 77. 
22 Nawaithama Al Sairafi, The Portuguese Influence in the Arabian Gulf (Riyadh, 1983), 111. 
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traditional trade. In 1602 AD, a Bahraini stabbed the Portuguese governor in Bahrain and 
declared himself the ruler. Soon after, the people of Bahrain stormed the fort and over-ran 
the garrison; the Portuguese era in Bahrain was thus drawing to its close. By 1622 AD 
they had even lost Hurmuz and were soon chased out of every port in the Persian Gulf.23 
This was also the period in which the Ottomans were exercising their authority and 
control over Egypt, Baghdad and southwards. 
D. BRITISH INFLUENCE 
The second half of the sixteenth century saw British attempts to influence the 
ever-lucrative trade routes of the Persian Gulf by coaxing the Persian rulers with 
concessions and offers of concessionary bilateral trade pacts. In 1598 AD, the British 
delegation to the court of Shah Abbas of Persia, offered to recognize the Persian army on 
modern basis and to work on the establishment of a closer relationship with the Christian 
West. This was an attempt to widen the gulf between the Ottomans and the Persians to 
serve their own future imperialist ambitions and to help them to act against the 
Portuguese, whose power and influence was on the decline. This enabled British 
authorities to obtain special trade facilities as the common hatred against the Portuguese 
helped the development of relations and gave it a sense of purpose. An Anglo-Persian 
alliance thus resulted in the establishment of British Agencies in Shiraz and Isfahan and 
elsewhere. The British East India Company, which had been earlier established in Surat, 
India in 1609 AD there by began to exert its influence in matters of the Persian Gulf 
region as a whole and this influence gained momentum and lasted for next couple of 
centuries. 
E. RISE OF AL-KHALIFAS IN ZUBARA AND BAHRAIN 
With the exit of the Portuguese at the beginning of the third decade of the 
seventeenth century, some Arab tribes ruling the eastern coast of the Persian Gulf ruled 
Bahrain. Occasionally they paid tribute to Persia (Modern day Iran). The best known of 
these tribes was Al-Madhkur, which ruled Bahrain in the middle of the eighteenth century 
23 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1994), 23. 
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until the siege of Zubara. This was a town situated in the north western part of modern 
day Qatar, which was ruled by Sheikh Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa of the Al-
Utoob tribe. Sheikh Nasr Al-Madhkur, who was the ruler of Bahrain and Bushire at that 
time attempted a full-scale invasion of Zubara and besieged the town in 1783 AD. The 
siege however failed and the battle was lost decisively. Following the defeat and flight of 
Sheikh Nasr Al-Madhkur to Bushire in Iran, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa 
turned his attention towards Bahrain and conquered it in 1783 AD. He became to be 
known as Ahmed Al-Fateh—“the Conqueror.”24 This event marked the beginning of an 
era of Al-Atoobs in Bahrain.   
The Al-Khalifa family continues to rule Bahrain until the present day. 
 F. BRITISH PROTECTION TREATIES 
Bahrain enjoyed a spell of relative peace and stability after its liberation by 
Sheikh Ahmed Al-Fateh, and the people of Bahrain welcomed the new administration. 
Nevertheless, it attracted the attention of its greedy neighboring powers, which were 
eager to establish control over it in view of the importance of its location, abundant water 
resources and wealth derived especially from its pearl-banks.   
In the early 19th century the Omanis invaded Bahrain and while a twelve-year-old 
child governed it, the Omani ruler Sayyid Sultan promoted his son, Salim, as governor in 
the Arad Fort.25 
The rulers of Bahrain, however, were not strong enough to continuously repel the 
offensive measures adopted by their neighbors. As such, in order to rule peacefully and 
be assured of continuity of rule, they had no choice except to enter into a protective treaty 
with the British, which had become highly influential and militarily strong in the region. 
To consolidate their position, the Rulers then signed the 1861 AD Perpetual Truce of 
Peace and Friendship, which was revised in 1892 AD and later in 1951 AD.26  
24 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage ,(London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 31. 
25 Abdul Hadi Al-Taz, An Unpublished Document about Bahrain (Manama: Al Watheeqa no. 4), 
108−112. 
26 James Onlay, The Politics of Protection in the Gulf (UK: Exeter University, 2004), 44.  
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Effectively these “treaties” implied that the rulers of Bahrain had to get prior 
permission of British Government before entering into relationships with any foreign 
government. In return Bahrain’s territorial integrity was ensured from all aggression by 
sea or through land attack. More importantly the British promised to support the rule of 
the Al-Khalifa in Bahrain, securing its unstable position as rulers of the country.27 
G. BAHRAIN IN THE NINETEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURY 
With such assurance of peace, sea trade flourished and by the middle of 19th 
century and Bahrain became an important trading center in the Persian Gulf. This led to 
prosperity, socio-economic changes and developments that laid the foundations of 
transforming Bahrain from a mere trading center into a modern state. The process 
involved a large migration of Persian families into Bahrain and attracted many Indian 
merchants who also set up businesses there. Consequently, Bahrain became the center of 
a web of trade routes across the regional countries and the Indian sub-continent.28 In 
particular, due to increased trade with India, sub-continental cultural influence had a 
marked effect. According to Exeter University’s James Onley “In these and countless 
other ways, eastern Arabia’s ports and people were as much a part of the Indian Ocean 
world as they were a part of the Arab world.29 
Bahrain went through major social reforms under the de facto rule of Charles 
Belgrave, who was the resident British advisor. Al-Hiddaya Boys School, the first 
modern school in the region, opened in 1919 AD, while the first girl’s school in the 
Persian Gulf opened in 1928 AD. Earlier a missionary hospital was established in 1903 
AD, while other reforms included the abolition of slavery.  
Bahrain was also the first to discover oil in the Persian Gulf, with the first oil well 
sunk on its soil in 1932 AD. The first oil refinery was subsequently established leading to 
the collapse of the pearl diving industry, which hitherto had been the main source of 
income in Bahrain. The oil industry on the other hand attracted hordes of laborers from 
27 Ibid., 45. 
28 Nelida Fucearo, Persians and the Space in the City of Bahrain (1863-1893), Transnational 
Connections and Arab Gulf, ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (New York: Routledge, 2005), 39. 
29 James Onlay, The Politics of Protection in the Gulf (UK: Exeter University, 2004), 78. 
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the surrounding countries that led to the emergence of a strong working class, which was 
to have important repercussions for the development of Bahraini society over the coming 
years. 
Bahrain fought on the side of the Allies during the Second World War and was 
mentioned in dispatches in late 1942 AD. 
H. INDEPENDENCE AND AFTERMATH 
After World War II, Bahrain became the center for British administration of the 
lower Persian Gulf. As trade and downstream industries flourished in the 1950s, a 
number of labor unions were formed which associated themselves with the leftist 
nationalistic movement that called for political reforms and an end to British hegemony 
in running the affairs of the country. They were also motivated by the Pan-Arab 
deterrence led by Egypt against the British and French invasion during the 1956 AD Suez 
Canal crisis. The British however retaliated with a heavy hand and managed to quell the 
uprising by declaring it illegal. Clashes ensued and a number of union leaders were 
arrested, imprisoned or deported.30 Thus, the seeds of discord were firmly laid. 
Yet another uprising called Intifada March stemmed in March 1965 AD against 
the continued presence of the British in Bahrain. It started with layoffs of large number of 
Bahraini staff at Bahrain Petroleum Company. This sparked a major riot in which several 
Bahraini protesters died. Judging from these changing tides, in 1968 AD, the British 
government in U.K then decided to end the treaty with the Persian Gulf sheikdoms. By 
mid-1971 AD, however, the nine sheikhdoms still had not agreed on the terms of union. 
Accordingly, Bahrain sought independence as a separate entity declaring independence 
on August 15, 1971, and becoming formally independent as the State of Bahrain on 
December 16, 1971.31 
After the 1973 AD Arab-Israeli war the price of crude oil sky-rocketed. While 
Bahrain’s own reserves were being depleted, the high oil price meant there was massive 
30 Mariam Joyce, “The Bahrain Three on St. Helena, 1956–1961” Middle East Journal, vol. 54 
(2000), 613−623,  
31 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 37. 
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capitalization in the Kingdom’s neighbors. The Kingdom itself was able to exploit this 
new to attract massive investment thanks to the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 AD. Beirut 
had long been the financial center of the Arab world, but the outbreak of hostilities in the 
country had an immediate impact on the banking industry. Bahrain offered a new location 
at the center of the booming Persian Gulf with a large educated workforce, which well 
versed in fiscal regulations and commercial traits. As growth surged, the middle class 
benefitted, thereby giving Bahrain a very different outlook and an independent class 
structure that was so much in variation from its tribal dominated neighbors. Overall 
Indians dominated the expatriate workforce and with opportunities galore their number, 
along with other third world country’s immigrants, who were also attracted by better 
salaries than at home, surged. This massive migration impacted the very bases of 
Bahrain’s demographics for years to come. 
Bahrain elected its first National Assembly in 1973 AD. A constitution was 
written and promulgated but the government soon ran into political stalemate, as it did 
not ratify the sponsored law. On the contrary arrest and detention of the people (for up to 
three years) was allowed. This led to public outcry and crises and in 1975 AD the Amir 
dissolved the National Assembly itself. 
I. IMPACT OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
The massively popular Iranian revolution, which overthrew a regime protected by 
a lavishly financed army and security services in the neighboring Iran in 1979 AD had 
profound implications for Bahrain’s social and political development. There were 
numerous factors that had caused Bahrain to be more liberal than its neighbors, but all of 
these were challenged by religious fundamentalism. Its pluralist traditions were to a large 
extent a result of the complex confessional and demographic makeup of the state, which 
required Shias, Sunnis, Southern Persians and other minority faiths to live and work 
together harmoniously, without prejudice, and to encourage and boost country’s 
dependence on trade. 
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The majority of conservative Shias in Bahrain were overawed by the Iranian 
revolution.32  On the other hand the political earthquake represented by Shah of Iran’s 
unceremonious demise provided an excellent opportunity to Imam Khomeini and his 
clerics in Iran to influence their co-religionists in Bahrain as prime agents to export the 
revolution.  
In 1981 AD, an Iranian front organization, the Islamic Front for the liberation of 
Bahrain attempted a coup d’état with a plan involving the assassination of Bahrain’s 
leadership and an Islamist uprising.33 The aim was to install a clerical leadership with an 
Iraqi as supreme leader, but the coup was detected after a tip off from a friendly 
intelligence source. The failed coup along with the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War led to 
the formation of the GCC which Bahrain joined with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates and the Saudi Arabia The regional uncertainty was further heightened when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait followed by the 1991 AD Gulf war. 
J. THE NERVOUS NINETIES 
The concentrated power of the Combined Allied Forces, led by United States of 
America, successfully ejected Saddam Hussein’s army from Iraq in 1991 AD. Bahrain 
played a key supporting role by providing the use of its naval and air bases as launch 
pads against Iraq. The uncertainties created by the war, however, led to a collapse in the 
price of oil. The ensuing frustration combined with political stalemate erupted in an 
unusual uprising, which was specifically Islamist in the sense that it began by the stoning 
of female competitors in a marathon race wearing “inappropriate clothing.” This was 
followed by petitions put up by a group led by Shiite Islamist leader asking for the 
restoration of the constitution and the 1975 AD National Assembly. The Amir, however, 
again took a firm stand and arrested the movement’s leaders. The unrest and 
confrontation continued for a number of years resulting into numerous civil disturbance 
rallies, riots and strict counter-measures that were adopted by the security forces. A total 
32 Takeyh Ray, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in The Iranian Republic (New York: Henry Holt & 
Company, LLC, 2006), 4–7 
33 Persian Gulf States, Table of Contents, U.S Library of Congress, 1999, http://countrystudies.us/
persian gulf states/99.htm, accessed June 23, 2011. 
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of 40 people died due to the resulting violence between the both sides.34 The situation 
was somewhat calmed when in 1999 AD the Amir of Bahrain died and his son, Sheikh 
Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa took charge. 
 K. KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
In 2003, AD Bahrain declared itself a Kingdom and Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa 
became its King.35 From the very beginning King Hamad adopted a reconciliatory 
attitude by easing the tension through release of political dissidents from prison and 
promised fair elections including woman franchise and promising a return to 
constitutional rule. The move brought an end to political violence, but did not initially 
bring about reconciliation between the government and most of the opposition groups, 
because the Shia population perceived the changes largely as superficial. Relations 
however improved with neighboring Qatar after the International Court of Justice in 
Hague resolved the border dispute over the possession of Hawar Islands. A “friendship 
bridge” linking the two countries is planned to be build.36 When completed it would be 
the longest bridge of its kind in the world. 
Although Bahrain opposed the invasion of Iraq during the second Gulf War in 
2003 AD, it remains strongly allied with United States and other western powers on 
matters of military cooperation and support including signing a Free Trade Agreement 
with the United States in 2004 AD. Concurrently, as an important member of the GCC, 
Bahrain has been noted to adhere to the cardinal goal of the Council in the achievement 
of security and stability within the region through mutual cooperation and support on all 
important economic, social and defense related issues.  
 
 
34 Munira A. Fakhro, The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1997) 
167–168 
35 The Estimate: Political and Security Intelligence Analysis of the Islamic World and its Neighbors, 
15, no. 4, 2002 
36 John Falby, “Qatar-Bahrain Friendship Bridge to begin construction next year” Newlaunches.com, 
23 Oct. 2011, http//wwww.newlaunches.com/archives/qatarbahrain_friendship_bridge (accessed 23 May 
2012). 
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III. IRAN: FROM MONARCHY TO THEOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Iran’s pre-Islamic history spans 1300-plus years and at one time covered three 
million square miles of territory.37  Ruled by a host of Dynasties, Empires, and 
Caliphates through centuries, the history of what represents the territories of present day 
Shi’ite Islamic rule in Iran begins largely from the period of Safavid rule beginning in 
1502 AD. It took firm roots as its monarchs established Twelver Shi’ism as the official 
religion of the empire thus marking an important and impressive turning point in the 
history of Islam as a whole. In post Islamic Revolution period up to the present times, 
governance in Iran is closely monitored and overseen by a string of religious scholars 
who ensure that edicts of Shi’ite Islam are strictly enforced in all walks of life with self- 
awareness of Iran-hood acting as a bridge to modern Iran. Significance of such a strict 
hard line Islamic rule is felt in Sunni led Arabian States across the Persian Gulf as they 
feel threatened of Iranian expansionist designs as manifested by the formulation and 
establishment of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) organization, Iran’s own nuclear 
ambitions, over the years its blanket material support to Hezbollah Shiite group in 
Lebanon, not to mention the instigation of Shi’ite Coup d’états and revolts in Bahrain, are 
but a few examples which will  be in focus in subsequent chapters. 
B. CONSOLIDATION OF SHIA’ISM 
It was during the Safavid rule that Shi’ism took firm roots. Its founder monarch 
Shah Ismail was a very intolerant Shi’ite ruler who carried out no less than complete 
destruction of Sunni Islam and was very successful in eradicating all its traces in areas 
that came fully under his control. For example he brutally enforced ritual cursing of the 
first three caliphs, Abu Buaker, Omar and Othman as usurpers, disbanded Sunni 
37 Sheda Vessghi, ‘The other Iran Story: Re-engineering the nation’s cultural DNA’, World Tribune 
News, WorldTribune.com (June, 2009). 
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practices, seized their assets and faced Sunni Ulema in with the choice of conversion, 
death or exile. He even imported Shi’ite scholars from abroad to replace them.38 
The complete predominance of Twelver Shi’ism in present day Iran is largely 
Shah Ismail’s doing as this split, though present for some centuries, hardened into 
manifesting two separate entities within the body politic of mainstream Islam. 
Consequently, Shia and Sunni cultures moved in different directions along geographical 
lines as Ottoman Empire, with its roots in Turkey, became the bastion of Sunni rule in the 
north, while Iran solidified its base for Shi’ite Islam under Safavid rule.  
C. HISTORICAL OUTCOME OF SAFAVID’S CONVERSION POLICY 
The policy of forced conversion to Shi’ite Islam had following historical 
outcomes: 
• The process of forcefully converting large masses of Sunni population to 
Shi’ism continued throughout the 16th and 17th century under different 
Safavid monarchs/ruler or Sultans as they were sometimes titled. From 
then on Shi’ite Islam became the state religion of Iran, while small Sunni 
minority within Iran was reduced to living along the borders with their 
Sunni co-nationals next door.39  
• The experience created a clear line of political demarcation and even 
though doctrinal differences had long been known, the hostility between 
the followers of two sects continued to brew to new levels.  
• The advent of Safavid power effectively signaled the end of Sunni Islam 
in Iran and most importantly, Shi’ite theologians came to dominate the 
religious establishments40 within the state. 
• Use of Shi’ism to exert control resulted in annexation of large areas of the 
country, but was followed by prolonged conflict between Sunni and Shia 
population even after the fall of Safavids.41Iran gradually became isolated, 
surrounded by a sea of Sunni dominated countries/States.  
 
38John Malcolm, The History of Persia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1829), 438. 
39 Daniel Brown, A New Introduction to Islam (New York: Brown, 1994), 191. 
40Afshia Molavi, The Soul of Iran: A Nation’s Journey to Freedom (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2002), 170.  
41Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots & Results of Revolution (London: Yale University Press, 2003), 
11. 
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D. QAJAR DYNASTY 
The history of modern day Iran though could be traced back from late 18th /19th 
century Qajar dynasty period, where autocratic monarch one after the other perpetuated 
despotic rule by claiming monopoly over the means of violence, taxation and 
adjudication. They ruled supreme by holding power to appoint and dismiss officials, 
courtiers, judges, tribal chiefs, all the way down to village chiefs and ward headmen. The 
monarchs claimed to own all property treating the country as their private estate by ruling 
through local notables, landed aristocracy, even clerics leaders and influential merchants 
in dealing with their subjects. As a result they lacked centralized power structure and had 
few viable government institutions worthy of the name.42  
Throughout the 19th century period different Qajar monarchs continued with their 
all-out efforts to consolidate Shi’ism by favoring and supporting the annual ritualistic 
ceremonies in the month of Muharram which commemorated43 the martyrdom of Imam 
Hussain through official backing and finances. They patronized theological centers in the 
cities of Najaf (In Iraq), Mashed, Isfahan and Qom to promote Shi’ite teachings through 
scholars whose followers later on played an important role in shaping the destiny of 20th 
century Iran. After establishing their dynasty on firm footings and securing borders, the 
Qajars settled in the capital Tehran and in due course merged into the urban population. 
Amongst the Qajar monarchs Nasiruddin Shah was the ablest and most influential 
and during his reign from 1847 AD to 1896 AD he introduced large-scale reforms in all 
sectors of Iranian society. His greatest contribution was the establishment of Dar-al 
Funoon,44 the first modern university in Iran which produced a new cadre of 
administrators and scholars who were well acquainted with western techniques (through 
French and Russian instructors as well as Iranians) who taught different languages and 
such diverse subjects as Medicine, Law, Engineering and Law. 
42Ibrahim Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20. 
43Ibid., 16. 
44 Ibid., 9. 
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In that period the British Empire was at its zenith and was extending its control 
and influence over the Persian Gulf region with use of its naval might. The discovery of 
oil in 1908 AD by the British in Khuzestan gave birth to intense renewed interest in the 
region as Imperial Russia in north of Iran started expanding its borders with conquest of 
present day Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, thereby severing historic Iranian ties with the 
cities of Samarkand and Bokhara. In the tussle, Nasiruddin Shah could not prevent 
Britain and Russia from encroaching into regions of traditional Iranian influence as 
evident from subsequent events. 
E. CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
After Nasiruddin Shah’s assassination in 1896 AD, Iran was ruled by ineffective 
and weak monarchs who brought financial ruin to the State due to their extravagant life 
style and expenses leading to heavy borrowing particularly from Russia.  
By this time four distinct classes45 had emerged within the Iranian social fabric. 
These were: 
• Clerics: The powerful religious scholars of Shi’ite Islam who impacted 
the life of ordinary citizens, particularly the illiterate peasants scattered 
over the country. 
• Bazaris or Merchants: Tradesmen, small business operators, mechanics 
and laborers who were gaining increasingly in strength and numbers in 
urban areas, bonding into a strong and economically better off educated 
middle class. 
• Upper Middle Class: Western Educated Intellectuals and enlightened 
scholars who were critical of the corrupt administration and advocated 
further reforms through their teachings and writings. 
• Landed Notables: The feudal lords who owned whole villages and vast 
areas of land and treated peasants as their serf. They often retained their 
own armies. 
 
The weak and ineffective Qajar rulers could not respond to the increasing protests 
and civil unrest led by the religious establishments, the Bazaris and other class of people 
45 Ahmed Ashraf, Social Hierarchy in the Qajar Era (Kitab-e-Aagoh, 1981), vol. 1, 71−75. 
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who all craved for constitutional reforms. The incumbent ruler Muzaffaruddin Shah was 
thus forced to pass a decree promising a constitution that provided strict limitations on 
royal power, and establishment of an elected parliament or Majlis. He signed the 
constitution in 1906 AD and died soon after. This constitutional revolution marked the 
beginning of the end of medieval period in Iran as well as sounded the death toll for 
Qajar dynasty. 
Hopes for an outright constitutional rule however were not realized due to 
continued internal instability and turmoil caused as result of sustained Russian and 
British intervention to divide Iran into respective spheres of influence. The occupation of 
Iran during World War I by Russia, British and Ottoman troops was a blow from which 
last of the weakened Qajar ruler Ahmed Shah never recovered. In 1921 AD a successful 
coup d’état by General Reza Shah, a Cossack garrison commander deposed Ahmed Shah 
and took control over Tehran. Within a short time he established himself as most 
powerful person in the country by suppressing rebellions and establishing order. In 1925 
AD a specially convened constitutional assembly named Reza Shah, who had earlier 
adopted the surname Pahlavi, as the new Shah of Iran. 
F. PAHLAVI ERA    
Reza Shah had the vision and ambition to carry out deep and far reaching reforms 
to modernize Iran and the hallmark of his era was guided towards building a strong 
centralized State. He had come to power in a vast country that had little presence outside 
the capital Tehran. As such, with help of foreign advisors and consultants, he embarked 
upon building a strong centralized infrastructure, planned and developed bureaucracy, 
established industrial units and factories and built a vast railroad network. He laid special 
emphasis upon modernization and build-up of his military/armed forces, health care and 
taxation systems to name a few. Over and above he maintained strict discipline and was 
highly successful in these endeavors. Historians are unanimous in crediting him for 
transforming Iran into an urbanized country where a professional middle class and an 
industrial middle class emerged as a strong body of people in Iran. Following two tables 
illustrate the efforts and the results in some of the sectors. 
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Revenue 1925-1926 1940-1941 
Total 245 3,613 
Direct Tax 34 75 
Road Tax 20 85 
Indirect Tax Total 36 180 
Customs 91 298 
Expenditures 245 4,333 
Major Ministries   
War 94 565 
Finance 30 265 
Education 7 194 
Industries - 992 
Agricultural - 121 
Roads - 1,092 
Imbalance - 71 
Table 1.   Iran’s Government Budgets, 1925–1926 and 1940–41 (in million Quan 
Rials; from Nowruzi, 1948). 
 
 
 1923-1924 1940-1941 
Pupils in Kindergartens 0 1,500 
Primary Schools 83 2,336 
Pupils in Primary Schools 7,000 210,000 
Secondary Schools 85 241 
Pupils in Secondary Schools 5,000 21,000 




As a constitutional monarch Reza Shah ruled with an iron fist but his strong 
secular policies caused dissatisfaction amongst some groups particularly the clergy who 
were opposed his reforms. 
In 1941 AD, during the Second World War, British and Soviet Armies invaded 
Iran and forced Reza Shah Pahlavi to abdicate in favor of his eldest son Mohammed Reza 
Shah Pahlavi.46  This happened because Reza Shah favored neutrality and supported 
German national technicians who by and large were employed in Iranian oil sector, a 
stance that was not acceptable to British –Russian Alliance. 
Towards end of the Second World War, as Soviet Allied forces withdrew, Iran’s 
political system became increasingly open. Political parties flourished and in 1944 AD 
the Parliament election was the most competitive election in more than 20 years. At that 
time patriotic feelings were high and there was a popular demand for nationalization of 
country’s oil fields along with curtailing the share of Anglo Iranian Oil Company, which 
was owned by British Government and hitherto the sole agency for producing and 
marketing Iranian Oil. 
In early fifties Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the young monarch who was 
eventually overthrown by the 1979 AD Islamic Revolution, successfully warded off his 
generals and nobles who tried to gain control of the armed forces. Consolidating power 
after the now “infamous” 1953 AD CIA led coup, which deposed the popular 
nationalistic government of Premier Mohammed Mussadaq, he ruled much like his father 
by utilizing country’s oil revenues to expand and consolidate his power base.47 With 
USA’s assistance and advice, he spent heavily to build up and expand his armed forces 
and internal security network through purchase of mostly U.S. arms and military 
hardware and consultancy. In 1963 AD he also launched a series of reform programs 
called “White Revolution” (So called because it was bloodless).48 This was yet another 
ambitious development program to modernize Iran through extensive land and 
46 Ibrahim Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 16. 
47 Ibid., 118. 
48 Time, “Iran: The White Revolution,” 87, no.6 (1996), 124. 
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administrative reforms involving abolishment of feudalism, introducing massive literacy 
drive, boosting industrialization and infrastructure on a large scale. For the first time 
women in Iran gained the right to vote, to run for an elected office and to serve as a 
lawyer or a judge.49 It was Shah’s attempt to introduce reforms from above and also to 
preserve traditional power patterns with an aim to transform Iran into a global economic 
and industrial powerhouse.  
The end result was an all-round improvement heralded by significant industrial 
revolution during the period of reforms. Yet, overall things did not go exactly as 
intended. The reforms resulted in quadrupling the combined size of the classes that had 
posed most challenges to the monarchy in the past, i.e., the intelligentsia and the working 
class. During the Seventies resentment towards monarch and monarchy in general grew 
as political parties, trade unions led by the strong Bazaris, professional associations and 
independent minded news media were all banned or their activities heavily curtailed. At 
the same time rampant large-scale corruption within Iranian government official channels 
aggravated the situation further. Resentment and anger towards monarch’s failed/stalled 
reforms simply united the populace against his government. Consequently, their loyalty 
to clergy increased, leading on to the rising popularity of the exiled cleric Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who was an outspoken political enemy of the Mohammed Reza Shah and 
through the years had been calling for outright overthrow of his regime. The “Iranian 
Revolution,” famously referred to as the “Islamic Revolution” of 1979 was the result. As 
Ervand Ibrahmian points out in his book “A History of Modern Iran,” “The White 
Revolution had been designed to preempt a Red Revolution; instead it paved way for an 
Islamic Revolution.”50  
 
49 White Revolution, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Revolution, accessed February 9, 
2013.  
50 Ibrahim Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 139−140 
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G. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE AFTERMATH 
The Islamic Revolution of Iran relegated the entire institution of Iranian 
monarchy to the dustbin of history in one clean sweep. Its charismatic leader, cleric Syed 
Ruhollah Khomeini had entered active politics in 1963 AD when he denounced 
Mohammed Reza Shah for granting capitulations to American military advisors.  
Deported, he spent next sixteen years in Najaf, Iraq, developing a new 
interpretation of Shi’ite Islam. In his book titled “Velayat-e- Faqeh, Hukumat-e-
Islami,”51he propounded that senior religious clerics specializing in Islamic Law had the 
ultimate authority to rule the Islamic state. He came to this novel conclusion from 
conventional Shi’ite premises: that God had sent the Prophets and Imams to guide the 
community to the right path in line with Islamic jurisprudence, the Sharia Laws and that 
in the absence of Twelfth Imam, his deputies in the world, the senior religious clerics, 
became the guardians of Sharia Law and their authority was above man made laws and 
challenges.  
The general population in Iran could not believe that they had gotten rid of their 
pompous monarchy with such swiftness and abundance. So they hailed the Islamic 
Revolution as a Devine intervention and greeted Imam Khomeini as Commander of the 
Revolution, Founder of Islamic Republic, Supreme Leader of Islamic Republic and most 
potent of all, Imam of the Muslim world. Strangely though, this was a title that Shias in 
the past had reserved for the Twelve Sacred Imams only. 
The newly formed Islamic Republic had much to contend with in its very early 
stages. The Iran–Iraq war of the decade was looming large as Sunni Muslim dominated 
regime of Saddam Hussain in neighboring Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 AD to 
take advantage of the revolutionary chaos with an attempt to destroy the “Islamic 
Revolution” in its infancy.52 It was not to be; the war dragged on for eight long years 
taking a heavy economic and human toll, which killed hundreds of thousands of soldiers 
51Ruhollah Khomeini, The Jurist’s Guardianship: Islamic Government (Tehran: The Institute for 
Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, 1978), 64. 
52 Efraim Karsh, The IRAN–IRAQ War, 1980–1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 72. 
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and civilian population on both sides. Battle weary and bruised, Islamic Republic of Iran 
did survive but the long war also provided an opportunity for the regime to strengthen its 
revolutionary ardor and revolutionary groups such as Revolutionary Guards at the 
expense of whatever opposition it faced from within.53 While enormously costly and 
destructive, the Iran–Iraq war helped drive for national unity and inhibited fractious 
debate and dispute in Iran.54  
H. SIGNIFICANCE OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
An important offshoot of Islamic Revolution had to do with the Iranian 
revolutionary’s desire and call for the overthrow of numerous Arab monarchies in the 
surrounding Persian Gulf region. They covertly advocated replacement of such regimes 
with Islamic Republics, much to the consternation of smaller Sunni-run Arab neighbors 
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states notably Bahrain. Most of these States 
were monarchies with sizeable Shi’ite population. Formulation of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), a political and economic union comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, whose leaders met in Jeddah in 1981 AD to 
pen down a cooperative support charter, was the direct consequence of fears emanating 
from Iranian type of Revolution taking roots in their own territories through exploitation 
of sympathetic Shi’ite population residing therein.  
Mutual security and military cooperation formed part and parcel of GCC charter 
and acts as an active covenant of its practical policies well into the present times. 
53 Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 88. 
54 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The IRAN–IRAQ Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1990), 
34. 
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IV. FORMATION OF GCC, REGIONAL WARS AND 
CONFRONTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1979 AD Islamic Revolution was not solely, and perhaps not primarily a 
religious revolution.55  Economic slump and middle class disillusionment with corruption 
and oppression of a regime many had previously supported were important factors, as 
was the natural dislike of the unequal relationship with the U.S.56 But importantly; the 
revolution drew great strength from its Shia form. It blended cohesion and a sense of 
unity, motivation and common purpose to other social elements that were not even 
perceived as religious. It generated group solidarity amongst Revolutionary Guards and 
their own experience of war with Iraq that followed the events created a strong bond of 
loyalty and trust within its ranks that is noticeable and sustained by the present day 
hardliners in President Ahmadinejad’s government. However, in the context of Bahrain-
Iran relations three events taking place in quick succession after the Islamic Revolution 
are important from point of their long-term effect down the years. These are: 
establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council, The Iran–Iraq War and the failed coup 
attempt in Bahrain 1981. These events need to be synopsized for purpose of clarity and 
information.  
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
The dramatic eruption of the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran followed by 
sudden invasion of Afghanistan57 by the Soviet Union sent alarm bells ringing in all 
Sunni Arab capitals of countries surrounding the Persian Gulf region. The conservative 
monarchy of Saudi Arabia in particular was most concerned and in order to safeguard the 
stability and security of the region, it took the lead in fostering support from other Arab 
countries to establish a commonwealth of Arab Gulf so as to defend their common 
55 Abrahamian Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 155. 
56 Michael Axworthy, Empire of the Mind-A History from Zoroaster to the Present Day (London: 
Penguin Books, 2007), 266. 
57 Joseph Kechichian, Third World Quarterly (1985), 7, no. 4, 853−881.  
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resources and industrial base. Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and 
Bahrain joined in and on 25th May, 1981, in a joint meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
established the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States or Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).58  
Since its inception GCC has made concerted efforts to cooperate in all fields, 
including security and unified regional defense policies. The adoption of such regional 
security/ defense measures and protecting their independence and political systems, 
remains its major goal. The raising of a combined “Peninsula Shield” force by the 
member states for the purpose of immediately intervening if any state was subjected to 
aggression coupled with safeguarding strategic oil routes in the Gulf is the cornerstone of 
such Military strategy. In addition GCC has actively adopted a political, economic and 
social strategy as well, which can be summarized as follows:59 
1. Political Strategy  
• strengthening coordination and integration among the GCC states 
• following a more balanced policy between the super powers 
• to strengthen Arab solidarity and making the necessary 
amendments to the Charter of the Leagues of the Arab states to 
introduce the principle of majority decisions 
• organizing responses to hostile propaganda claims 
2. Economic Strategy 
• diversification of sources of income and a progressive reduction in 
the total reliance of oil 
• to achieve a common currency and unified custom tariff for all 
member states 
• strengthening the industrial sector and making it effective 
• provision of reserves for future generations 
• revision of the distribution of income and wealth 
58 Abdullah Al Ishal, Al-Itar al-Qaumi wal Siyasi li-majlis al-Taawanal-Khali (Riyadh: The Legal and 
Political Framework of the Gulf Cooperation council, 1983), 7. 
59 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York,: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 132−133. 
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• dealing with the effects of wide disparities in wealth and income 
among the GCC states 
• achieving food and oil security 
3.  Social Strategy 
• strengthening the internal fronts within the GCC states 
• bringing about desirable social development through means 
adjusted to the program of development in the GCC states as 
follows: 
• strengthening the value of individual participation in the 
development of society 
• strengthening the concept of public service in the society 
• emphasizing the value of work, production and innovation 
• active participation of women in social life 
• rectifying faulty concepts of identity on the basis of country, 
region and nation 
• organizing the employment of foreign manpower and taking 
measure to rectify its effects 
• providing training to create skills and expertise60 
 
Summit meetings headed by the Rulers of GCC states, as well as side meetings 
between Defense, Interior and Foreign Ministers are regularly held in rotation in GCC 
capitals to continuously update the Charter in view of perceived threats and ever 
changing political scenarios.61 
C. GCC CHALLENGES AND IRAN’S NUCLEAR STANCE 
Iranian nuclear ambitions and its perceived threat of developing nuclear capabilities in 
military terms is definitely in the forefront of challenges faced by the GCC states, 
particularly from Bahrain’s point of view, which considers itself vulnerable due to its 
small size and yet being the nearest to Iran’s major nuclear facility at Bushair.62 
60 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York,: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 131. 
61 Robin Allen, Gulf Cooperation Council-Theory or Practice? (U.A.E: Middle East Economic 
Digest, 1983), 27, no. 43,12.  
62 Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (New York: Rutledge, 1988), 210. 
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However, such relations cannot be limited to the nuclear issue alone. The concerns of 
GCC states63 have also arisen out of some rash and extreme statements coming from 
Iranian government officials such as from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in January 2005 who 
was quoted as saying “The foundation of world’s arrogance will collapse and the flag of 
Islam will be raised very soon.”64 
Understandably, the GCC views Iranian nuclear crises in the overall context of 
policies and attitudes of the Iranians towards the Gulf region and the wider Arab world.  
Iran is an Islamic state in the neighborhood of Arab world and the basis of interstate 
relationships therefore rests upon good neighborliness, respect for each other’s 
sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. Much of the problem however lies 
with confrontational nature of Iranian policies with little regard for Arab sensitivities. 
Surprisingly, much of this perceived hostility stems from internal conflicts and political 
wrangling within the Iranian state. 
One of the reasons of instability in the area could also be attributed to negative 
implications of U.S. diplomacy in Iraq, which has resulted in favoring Iran.65 On the 
other hand the aggressive nuclear policy adopted by Iran has similar destabilizing effect 
on the security of the Arab world. In addition, Iran controls the main centers of power 
within the state of Iraq and dominates its political process and decision making apparatus. 
Iran also influences the political and security scenario in Lebanon and Palestinian 
politics, not to mention the rejection of any possible peaceful solution with regard to its 
occupation of the three UAE Islands, which remains a disputed issue.66 
Iran’s nuclear program is another source of grave concern for its gulf neighbors 
that can lead to military confrontation as Iran under Ahmadinejad is taking the position 
which is similar to the one adopted by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which lead to a 
catastrophic war in the Gulf. It is for this reason that the western powers were able to 
63 Abdulaziz O. Sager, GCC Summit: Prospects and Challenges, 2007, Arab News, 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/306058 (accessed on February 15, 2013). 
64 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 
2006), 69.  
65 Ibrahim Ervand, Empire Strikes Back: Iran in U.S. sights (New York: New Press, 2004), 96. 
66 Geoffrey Kemp, Iran’s Strategic Environment and Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Nixon 
Centre, 2001), 101. 
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adopt the UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, which censured Iran to 
suspend all uranium reprocessing activities on its territory.67 Despite repeated calls these 
resolutions have been ignored and Iran continued with the enrichment process and at the 
same time raised the level of political and military rhetoric. It is important to note that a 
clampdown on Iranian enrichment activity is no longer a European or American demand; 
instead it has the requisite backing of the International community which has conferred 
much wider credence. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will 
continue to impose more and more severe economic and diplomatic sanctions against 
Iran. On the other hand, the Arab states are not particularly happy with these UNSC 
resolutions, which are seemingly logical and acceptable, but alone would not stop Iran 
from pursuing its nuclear ambitions. Iran’s plea of pursuing the nuclear program for 
peaceful purposes has not gained wider acceptance and GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait) have already announced their own intentions of launching 
peaceful nuclear programs which could come into effect within the next decade.   
The hegemonic ambitions of Iran and the heightened sectarian tensions in the 
region are only a few examples from numerous threats facing GCC states. The challenges 
facing them are numerous and in order to secure their common vital interests they must 
work out a unified contingency plan in case a war breaks out over the Iran nuclear issue. 
D. IRAN–IRAQ WAR 
Lasting eight years (also referred to as the “Longest war of the twentieth 
century”) and costing billions of dollars and hundreds and thousands of casualties, the 
conflict is a remarkable story of power politics and political hypocrisy.68 It was a 
multifaceted war that was started with Iraq’s territorial claims in Shat al Arab and other 
border areas, coupled with each side’s attempt to change the recognized and existing 
borders.69 In effect Saddam Hussein launched his invasion at a time when Iran, soon after 
67 Alireza Jaferzadeh, ‘The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crises’ (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), vol. 14, no. 4, 208. 
68 Anthony Cordsman & Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II: The IRAN–IRAQ 
War (Colorado: WestView Press, 1990), 23. 
69 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 148. 
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the advent of Islamic Revolution, appeared weak. His goal was to gain control over the 
Shatt al Arab waterway and some of the Iranian oilfields. He also feared the Iranian 
religious/revolutionary propaganda in 1979/1980, (apparently directed at starting a 
revolution amongst Iraqi Shi’s)70 and destroying his regime, and that left him little 
choice. However, he miscalculated Iran’s resolute stand as it did not capitulate, instead, 
in a robust counterattack, it was able to capture significant segments of Iraqi territory.71  
The war continued through mid-eighties and just when it seemed that Iran was 
gaining militarily, the United played its double handed role and sided with Iraq, a role 
which, in effect, kept Iraq from being defeated.72 Throughout this crucial period, U.S. 
intelligence sources provided regular communication on Iranian troop movements which 
enabled Iraq to plan effective defense or prepare for counter-attack as the case may be. 
Secondly, Iraqi troops often resorted to the use of poison gas in combat which gave them 
an upper hand; while Iranians had no defense against it.73 This heinous act was a direct 
violation of a number of major international treaties and was conducted with full 
knowledge and implicit approval of United States, which considered Iranian victory as 
contrary to its own interests.   
The Iran–Iraq war was the longest declared war of the twentieth century, lasting 
eight years and ending right where it started. The political machinations among all the 
nations in that area were extensive, and they were very complex in the background of 
shifting and partial alliances among the Muslim nations, detailing why each nation 
adopted the policies that they did. However, with hindsight, it is difficult to brush aside 
the colossal and tragic loss that both countries suffered in terms of human lives. Exact 
casualty figures perhaps may never be known, though estimates suggest more than one 
and a half million war and war-related casualties, perhaps as many as a million people 
died, lots more wounded, and millions made refugees. Iran acknowledged that nearly 
70 Michael Axworthy, Iran: Empire of the Mind: A History of the Zoroaster to the Present Day 
(London: Penguin Books, 2007), 272.                     
71 Farhang Ragaee, The Iran Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression (Florida: University Press of 
Florida, 1993), 28. 
72 Ibrahim Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 171. 
73 Efraim Karsh, The IRAN–IRAQ War, 1980–1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 76. 
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300,000 people died in the war; estimates of the Iraqi dead range from 160,000 to 
240,000. Iraq suffered an estimated 375,000 casualties and another 60,000 were taken 
prisoner by the Iranians. Iran’s losses included more than 1 million people killed or 
maimed.74  It was truly a catastrophe of mega proportions and it is an irony that 
internationally this longest war of the twentieth century has not received the attention that 
it deserves.  
The war finally came to an end when United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolution 598 was accepted by Iran on 20 August 1988. A cease-fire followed but when 
it was over, none of the conditions that existed at its beginning were resolved and 
remained virtually unchanged.    
E. ATTEMPTED COUP IN BAHRAIN, 1981 
Within two years of the Islamic Revolution, Iran mischievously interfered in the 
domestic policies of Bahrain by stirring up and perpetrating a dramatic coup attempt 
against the ruling Al-Khalifa family through a Shia resistance group who were inspired 
by the Iranian Revolution and called themselves ‘The Islamic Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain.’The plan involved a small group of Bahraini militants, who were to be assisted 
by their Iranian counterparts with an aim to assassinate the emirate’s leadership (Bahrain 
in 1981 was still an Emirate and later was proclaimed a Kingdom in 2002). Their 
objective was to stir up general public outrage and popular uprising of the majority Shia 
population in Bahrain, preempting government fallout, which was to be then replaced by 
a theocratic government on similar lines as in Iran.   They had even named an Iranian 
based Iraqi cleric, Hojjatol-Islam Kamal Haidari, who was to have been put in power as 
Supreme Leader of theocratic government in Bahrain.75 
The attempted coup failed in its objective because security personnel of a 
neighboring emirate spotted a suspicious party of young men who had come from Iran 
and were transiting to Bahrain. Their arrest revealed substantial caches of ammunition 
and communication equipment. Detailed plans of sabotaging and taking over important 
74Ibid., 86. 
75 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of Middle East (U.K.: Manchester University 
Press, 2003), 194. 
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infrastructure such as T.V/Radio station, international airport and assassinating important 
Bahraini government officials were also revealed.     
The fiasco led to a steep downturn in relations between the states of the newly 
formed GCC and Iran. Iran was also blamed for creating tensions in the Persian Gulf 
Arab societies between Sunnis and Shias. All those who were arrested were sentenced to 
heavy prison terms. The coup highlighted the underlying dissention between  Sunni-Shia 
population of Bahrain in clear terms and manifested again through regular on again off 
again kind of Shia led civil disturbances throughout the nineties. The political prisoners 
were however amnestied by King Hamad Al-Khalifa in 2001 AD as part of political 
reforms.  
F. INTERIM YEARS: POST-KHOMEINI ERA 
In late eighties the world was experiencing some very dramatic changes on the 
political and social front. The protracted Afghan war had come to an end, Soviets were 
on the run, the Soviet Union break up was on the cards, Berlin Wall was crumpling, Iraq 
suddenly found itself in an 80 Billion dollars debt, Imam Khomeini had passed away 
leaving the World Powers to wonder as to which way the radicalized Iran would go, and 
amongst all this hoopla, Mr. Saddam Husain calmly decided to fill up his depleted coffers 
by deciding to rob the mideastern gold mine, the tiny sheikhdom of Kuwait, through a 
well-planned military invasion on August the second, 1990. Initially the world took little 
notice of this Iraqi adventure thinking it to be insignificant of their attention. However, 
this misconception was soon put to rest when they noticed that Iraqi forces, through 
sudden and rapid advance, were very close to threatening the Saudi Arabian rich and vast 
oil resources located on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia. The resultant “First Gulf War,” 
as it is now referred to, and led by the only Super power left in the world arena, the 
United States of America, helped and assisted by coalition of 32 international military 
forces, joined hands to push back Iraqi military forces to its borders through swift and 
decisive land and air battles. Of course Iraqi military was no match against the might of 
coalition forces; they were quickly desecrated but it was a job half-done considering that 
the scepter of Saddam Husain’s hard core dictatorship continued to haunt other middle-
east countries right through to the dawn of the twenty first century until the “Second Gulf 
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War” in 2003 AD. Ironically, this time United States was the invader, which had a 
trumped up mandate of cleansing the region from the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by Iraqi regime, a charge that was sanctified by United Nations to legitimize 
the 2003 invasion of Kuwait. And while all this happened Israel, the possessor of an 
undeclared amount of nuclear arsenal under its belt, idly stood by watching gleefully the 
demise of its biggest threat in the person of Saddam Husain at the hands of its own 
erstwhile enemy, the people of Iraq.   
The cost in human life in Iraq was and is enormous, as it continues to bleed even 
eight years after Saddam’s departure from the scene. All for the sake of ensuring the free 
flow of mideastern oil that fuels the economic powerhouse of the combined West. Just 
for record Saudi Arabia purchased arms worth 80 Billion Dollars from United States 
alone during the first eight years after the end of First Gulf War.76 In one order of 5 
billion dollars, UAE bought 500 Leclerc tanks from France in mid-nineties.77 (These 
tanks would be out of commission by now). There are numerous other examples of 
massive defense equipment/weapon system purchases by most countries in the region 
throughout the nineties and until to date. Latest being President Obama administration’s 
order where it is expected to formerly notify U.S. Congress of a record setting arms sale 
worth 60 Billion Dollars to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.78 The deal is expected to 
benefit the U.S. defense industry significantly and includes 84 F-15E fighters and almost 
200 helicopters, including Apaches and Black Hawks. The sale also is a sign of the 
seriousness of the military threat that the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf 
perceive from Islamic Republic of Iran. Wars can also be very profitable indeed. 
On the Iranian side, death of Khomeini as the Imam and charismatic leader of the 
Islamic revolution in June of 1989 did not mean the end of the revolution, but only the 
beginning of a protracted struggle amongst the followers of the revolution over his 
heritage. In the post revolution period his main contribution was that he was the architect 
76  Frahan Marzooki, Middle East Journal (New York: Spring 2000), vol. 53, no. 5, 512. 
77 Ibid.,514. 
78 American Online (AOL) News, “U.S. Plans $60 Billion in Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia,” 
http//www.aolnews.com/2010/09, accessed May 12, 2011. 
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of the present system of collective rule by clerical councils, thereby setting the 
parameters of Iran’s subsequent constitutional policies which are firmly practiced even 
until the present times. He emphasized that “Government must observe the divine Law 
and this is not possible without the supervision of the clergy.”79 He enthused his 
colleagues and subordinates with this dictum and they in turn took this legacy and 
consolidated the state into Shi’ite theocracy through major transformation of the legal 
system based on a written constitution.   
The sequence of moderate governments that followed under President Rafsanjani 
(1989 AD–1997 AD) and some democratic reforms under President Khatami (1997 AD–
2005) was followed by an unforeseen spectacular reversal that surprised everyone outside 
Iran. The hard liners returned to capture the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) in national 
elections of 2005 AD. President Ahmadinejad, the new incumbent (2005 AD–Present) 
revived the revolutionary outlook of the old. Coupled with aggressive policy and a 
clandestine nuclear program, his political regime has proved resilient and internationally 
defiant despite protestations of younger half of the population. 
G. BAHRAIN DURING THE NINETIES AND BEYOND 
Iraq’s sweep into Kuwait in August 1990 and the possibility of its forces 
continuing down the gulf coast to seize other oil-rich Arab states presented a frightening 
scenario for smallest of the Gulf States like Bahrain. However, soon after the liberation of 
Kuwait in March 1992, Bahrain stepped up its efforts in building up its armed forces with 
western arms suppliers as did most other GCC states. During the following years it 
received generous economic support from richer GCC member states like Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. On the political front, however, it was unable to restrict the majority Shi’a 
opposition factions, who, in December 199480 had started a campaign for the restoration 
of the 1973 AD constitution through civil disturbances. This led to a swift crackdown by 
the governmental agencies and a period of uncertainty followed. The incident however 
79 Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini, Iran under his Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 20. 
80 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The 
United Arab Emirates and Oman (New York: Holt Publications, 1997), 121. 
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emphasized the frail relationship that Bahrain had with its eastern neighbor across the 
gulf as it once again blamed Iran for providing covert support to Shi’a militant groups 
within Bahrain. Although there were some retributions in the following years, whereby 
most of the arrested Shi’a leaders were granted amnesty and release from prison terms by 
the Amir of Bahrain Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa in 1997 AD, however, the actual 
turn of events took place years after his death in the early part of the new millennium by 
the present ruler of Bahrain, his son, Sheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa.  
The true nature of Bahrain-Iran relationship projected into the first decade of the 
twenty first century and beyond will be the focus of attention in the last two chapters of 
this thesis that follow. 
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V. BAHRAIN–IRAN RELATIONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of Bahrain-Iran relations with each other and with regional 
countries in the Persian Gulf, we have already covered the historical and political 
perspective until the end of century in relative details in the foregoing chapters. Moving 
ahead, in this chapter of the thesis, we shall discuss their strengths, weaknesses and 
aspirations for progress and stability as the two countries power ahead in the twenty first 
century, by focusing and analyzing the core issue of the dispute, i.e., the ethnic divide 
that has split the region into two power blocks.  
In conclusion, foreign relations between the two countries will be analyzed in the 
backdrop of the prevailing political atmosphere in the spring/summer of 2011 AD. 
B. BAHRAIN’S OUTLOOK, PROGRESS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Often referred to as “The Pearl of the Gulf,” Bahrain is an island abundant with 
underground aquifers that provide life-sustaining water continues to be quite popular 
amongst tourists.81 It is listed as the second most attractive tourist location in the Middle 
East.82  In 1994 its total population was around 568,000, reaching 600,000 people in 
1997.83 Expatriate workers and technocrats from Iran, Oman, Yemen, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines and other countries constituted about a third of these figures while the Shiite 
Muslims constituted the majority (about 60 percent).84 Interestingly, in February 2011, 
AFP, on their website reported that according to the official statistics office, the number 
of foreigners living in the tiny Gulf Kingdom of Bahrain overtook the number of local 
nationals for the first time. This was in accordance to a census carried out in April, 2010 
which indicated that out of Bahrain’s 1.234 Million inhabitants, about 54% were 
81 Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International, 1994), 2.  
82 Mid East Travels (Beirut: Arab Publications, 2004), 15. 
83 Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs, Statistical Gazette (Bahrain: Government Office, 1998), 6. 
84 Bahrain government has, to date, never published any official count or figures of the Shi’ites 
population in the country. However, most reporting agencies denote the figure to be in the range of 60% to 
70%. 
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foreigners, while only 568,399, or 46% were nationals. They went on and added that, “At 
562,040, Asians nationals made up 84.3% of the foreign residents and 45.5% of the total 
population of the country.”85 
The above analysis is interesting and points towards the basis of the most recent 
discord between the majorities Shi’a local population who repeatedly accuse Sunni led 
government of giving citizenship to Sunni foreigners to tip the sectarian balance of power 
in Bahrain.   
As recorded earlier, Bahrain started its oil production as far back as1932 AD and 
resultant oil revenues brought in economic prosperity, giving it a distinct advantage over 
other Arab Gulf states to start with. In this context Bahrain is the most socially advanced 
country in the region. Bahrain’s oil reserves have currently been reduced to a level where 
they are just about sufficient to fulfill its domestic demand. It however possess significant 
amount of natural gas reserves and its petroleum refining industry is well placed to 
sustain economic development and comfortable living standards for its citizens due to the 
Saudi crude availability, which is locally processed and refined.86 According to a 1996 
survey the oil and gas reserves amounted to an estimated 65% of its national revenue 
which was found to be the lowest percentage amongst all Arab Gulf states, thus 
indicating the need for Bahrain’s economic diversification. Consequently, it drove 
Bahrain to prepare for a time when oil reserves would be insufficient and therefore felt 
the need to invest extensively in human resources including development of training and 
educational programs.87  
Bahrainis found this experiment to be quite challenging as they became more and 
more involved in the education sector as well as other sectors of their economy. This 
immensely benefitted the women work force as they were able to find employment in 
engineering commerce, civil service, finance, banking and other administrative 
85 Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1998),15, no. 3, 213. 
86 Encyclopedia, Bahrain, Encyclopedia.com, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Bahrain.aspx#3-
1G2:3409700025-full, accessed February 20, 2013. 
87 Hamad Khamis Al Kaabi, ‘Economic Progress and Development of Infra –structure in  GGC 
Countries’ (Riyadh: Al Arabi Magazine Press,) no. 248, 17. 
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assignments.88 They also benefitted from law of liberal maternity leave which was 
enforced strictly. The leadership of Sheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa towards the end of 
the 20th century brought in rapid changes through political reforms and abolishment of 
censorship. He took a further major step in releasing all political prisoners which was 
followed by  declaration o f a ‘charter’   for national unity government through a national 
parliament, thereby foreseeing Bahrain as a liberal democratic entity in times to come. 
An overwhelming majority of Bahraini people backed and approved this charter by 
98.4% while voter turnout was reported to be 90%.89 He thus envisioned to launch a new 
era in Bahrain’s history with a hope that it would increase domestic stability and 
eventually lead to a decrease in the control of the ruling Al Khalifa family. 
In years that followed, Bahrain experienced a period of relative calm. Helped by 
the economic boom that prevailed in the region, it focused on developing its 
infrastructure by launching mega government and private sector projects. On the politico-
economic front Bahrain continued to play a major role in providing United States with 
the necessary logistical support during and after its military venture into Iraq in 2003 AD 
and beyond. However, worldwide economic meltdown in the fall of 2008 AD affected 
Bahrain economically perhaps a trifle more than other countries in the region, mainly 
because of its heavy dependence on earnings through the baking sector. It was slowly 
getting back on its feet when the events following “Arab Spring” uprising of late 2010 
AD jolted the very base of Bahrain government with majority Shi’as, taking a cue from 
Tunisia and Egypt, thought it opportune to stage wide ranges of protests to cash on the 
sentimental wave of pro-democracy movements sweeping the North African region.90 
Unlike Tunisia and Egypt they, however, failed to dislodge the sitting government or its 
leaders who were at the helm of affairs. This also does not mean that there is peace 
88 Hamad Khamis Al Kaabi, ‘Economic Progress and Development of Infra –structure in  GGC 
Countries’ (Riyadh: Al Arabi Magazine Press,) no. 248, 17. 
89 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Bahrain: Evolution or Revolution, 2011, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/bahrain-evolution-or-revolution, accessed June 4, 
2011.  
90 The ‘Arab Spring’ refers to the pro-democracy uprisings presently sweeping the Middle East and 
North African region. 
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within. Far from it and this is where the role of Iran and its relations with Bahrain, and 
the underlying discord of ethnic dissention come into play. 
 We shall review these after a brief survey of Iranian progress and achievements 
into the twenty first century.  
C. IRANIAN PROGRESS 
The emergence and consolidation of the present system of collective rule by 
clerical councils and the peaceful transition to dual leadership by the Ayatollah as the 
supreme guide and the subordinate president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in short, 
forms the crux of Iranian pattern of governance. In this context the general elections of 
2005 AD provided a watershed moment in the history of Modern Iran and needs to be 
looked into with a bit of detailed scrutiny to get the flavor of Iranian politics as they stand 
today. 
The 2005 AD elections gave President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a landslide 
victory over his opponent Mir Hussein Mussavi.91 It was a political earthquake which 
had its effects felt in the western capitals as they were expecting a continuation of the 
moderate policies followed by President Khatami, and were hoping for a return of the 
gradual democracy with which they hoped to bind well as they did in the good old pre-
Islamic Revolution days of the Shah. It was not to be. Mussavi was convinced that only 
through widespread fraud could Ahmadinejad win a two to one victory. During the 
ensuing wave of protests the Islamic regime’s security forces opened fire and several 
demonstrators were killed.92 Was this a repetition of the mass protest movement that 
toppled the Shah 30 years earlier? Not an easy question to answer as a positive answer 
would mean that Iranians would be faced with the dynamics of another revolution, 
against the Islamic revolutionary regime this time, a theocratic regime, that was (and 
continues to be so until to date) led by Khomeini’s successor, the Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the true holder of power in the country. 
91 John Danszewiski, “Hard-Liner Wins Decisively in Iran Presidential Election.” Los Angeles Times 
June 25, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/25/world/fg-iranelect25 (accessed Feb. 10, 2012) 
92Syed Amir Arjumand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 72−73. 
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The situation in Iran resembled a cauldron, but there was no way to predict the 
course of events as both the Islamic regime and the opposition were confronted with 
enormous dilemmas. The first question that was to be answered was whether the 
opposition represented a reform movement or, was it a revolutionary force bent upon 
overthrowing the Islamic government? The point to note was that the leader of the protest 
movement, who challenged Ahmadinejad and galvanized the masses, in urban centers 
especially, was not someone who could be considered an opponent of the Islamic 
character of the regime. Mir Hussein Mussavi was (and is) among the dedicated leaders 
of the Islamic revolution and served it with commitment as Prime Minister from 1981–
1989.93 In fact during his tenure as Premier, the regime faced the challenge of the 
Mujahedin Khalq, an Islamo-Marxist opposition group that had a fall out with Khomeini 
and started a violent campaign against his regime. Among others, the Mujahedin 
assassinated a key figure of the revolution, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, whose close 
associate was Mussavi. With Khomeini’s blessings, a resolute Premier Mussavi, 
confronted ruthlessly the Mujahedin Khalq and neutralized their role in Iran.94 In other 
words, it could be concluded that Mussavi, a true child of the Islamic revolution, did not 
aim at overthrowing the Islamic regime but at reforming it. This would sum up what the 
2005AD anti-Ahmadinejad protests were about.  
An important point to note was that going by the available statistics, over 65% of 
the Iranian population was under 30 years old, meaning that they were born after the 
Islamic revolution of 1979 AD.95 This young lot was faced with a deteriorating economic 
situation where students had no future, and above all they yearned for more freedom as 
they got choked under the repressive rule of the theocratic regime. Moreover, women, 
who later played an important role in the above mentioned protest movement of 2005AD, 
continued to yearn for a more open society96 that would allow them to escape the 
93Alex Altman, ‘World Section: Iran’s Challenger, Mir Hussain Mousavi’, Time Magazine, 2009, 
http.//www.time.com/world/article/0,8599,1904194,00.htm, accessed December 10, 2010. 
94 Ibid 
95 Population of Iran, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran, accessed May 13, 2011. 
96 Munira A. Fakhro, The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1997), 
15 
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“morality police” roaming the streets and harassing them if their hair was not completely 
covered by a scarf, if they would wear lipstick, if they were to hold hands with their 
boyfriend, etc., etc. This younger generation seemed tired of the continuous confrontation 
with the West and would be happy to see their leaders open a dialogue with the United 
States, based on mutual respect.  
This “reform movement” however could not be sustained in the form of mass 
protests and did fizzle away in the face of a strong government backed police/militia 
force. The change that occurred was that now the protesters all over had a new tool they 
did not possess a few years ago. They used the Internet, Twitter, YouTube, Face book, 
and cell phones to organize protests, something that was difficult for the regime to 
control.97  
In the final analysis the regime did score a decisive victory over the opposition 
movement. Yet, while it was able to suppress mass protests, it did so at considerable 
expense to its credibility and moral authority. The brutal methods employed by the 
government against protesters, were reminiscent of the methods used by the Shah to 
suppress opposition to his regime. The brutality of the Shah’s secret police (SAVAK) 
was a contributing factor to the 1979 AD Islamic revolution. Several veterans of this 
revolution including some Ayatollahs, among them senior Ayatollah Hussein Ali 
Montazeri, openly criticized the Ahmadinejad government as following the Shah’s 
footsteps. Nothing could be more detrimental to the legitimacy of the Islamic regime than 
to be seen by a very substantial sector of society as being as oppressive as or even more 
oppressive than the Shah’s. The fact that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei came 
down positively on the side of Ahmadinejad and pronounced him President who won in 
“fair elections,” raised the stake for the Islamic establishment. By siding with 
Ahmadinejad and approving the crushing of the opposition by force, the Supreme Leader 
raised questions over Ayatollah Khomeini’s carefully crafted role in the constitution of 
the highest office of Supreme Leader known as “Vilayat-e Faqih” or the rule by the 
theologian jurist. This rule, a form of rule by a Muslim “philosopher king” representing 
97This “Social media” factor played an important role in amassing of “Dissident Protests” during the 
Shi’a uprising in Bahrain in 2011. 
 46 
                                                 
God’s will on earth, was supposed to be infallible. As such, this rule should be wise as 
well as one that stayed above the usual fray of politics to serve as the ultimate arbiter in 
case of crisis. By siding openly against the opposition and sanctioning the use of force 
that included the killing of protesters, mass arrests, torture and show-trials, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, in 2005 AD was viewed by many Iranians not as a just 
ruler but as the leader of a dictatorial regime. This struck at the heart of the moral 
authority of the Islamic regime which was being openly questioned.98 
The United States administration took a stand in condemning the brutal 
suppression of the opposition and pursued with other western allies, a series of sanctions 
against Iran.99 These sanctions were contemplated with regard to Iran’s nuclear program 
and ambition to become a nuclear power, not unlike Pakistan. The prospect, an Iran 
possessing an atomic bomb, was quite sobering and forced the Obama administration not 
to close the window of future contacts with Iran. This delicate diplomatic dance by 
Washington was aimed at finding a way out of the impasse so that Iran abandoned to 
produce a nuclear bomb. 
Alas, the story of 2005 elections was re-enacted, with same players and the same 
audience, in the next Iranian general elections that were held in 2009. Ahmadinejad was 
re-elected and all protestations were once again put aside by Khamenei, the Supreme 
Leader.100    
However, this does not mean that the Islamic regime do not have popular support, 
far from that. Much to the consternation of the Western powers that be, the Iranians seem 
to be consolidating their unique form of government through a well-planned and 
controlled religious bias that the moderates within find hard to deal with. Saddam’s (its 
erstwhile enemy No. 1) exit from the scene, American Forces’ gradual pullout and the 
formation of a Shia led coalition government in Iraq (aided and abetted by Iran) have all 
98 Michael Collins, Iran’s 2005 and 2009 Presidential Election:  Curious Results 
http://electiondefensealliance.org/eda-blogs/michael_collins/080709/Iranian-election-anomalies (accessed 
23 Nov. 2011) 
99 Steven Weisman, U.S. Pursues Tactic of Financial Isolation, New York Times, 2006. 
100 Aljazeera Online, “In Depth,” Time Line: Iran after the Elections, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/
iran/2009/11/200911411259869709.html (accessed 23 Nov. 2011) 
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been watched gleefully by the Iranian Government. Bahrain’s uprising and protests by 
Shi’a populace is also something that Iranians would back and support so as to broaden 
their own Shi’a base within the region. 
At the same time as the economic woes of the only super power in the region, the 
Americans, continue to mount, Iranians leadership has deftly managed to keep its nuclear 
enrichment program on course towards the ultimate production of a nuclear weapon. It is 
not Iran’s stated goal, but it is what the experts and the science gurus, who have the inner 
knowledge of what it takes to make the nuclear device, are clear in their minds about: 
that Iran is only bidding away in time.101 They know that time is on the side of Iranians 
and it is with this trepidation that Western powers are confronted with, and exactly what 
withholds them from going in for an all-out military option. Iran’s leaders are aware of 
this trepidation as they continue with their cat and mouse tactics with the International 
Atomic Energy Commission’s experts who, despite years of negotiations, have yet to 
come out with a categorical statement that Iran is on a definite path towards making of a 
nuclear device. It may be a dilemma for them but looking from the Iranian perspective, it 
is an achievement which does their leaders proud. 
In the final analysis, both the domestic situation in Iran as well as its drive to 
become a nuclear power is not amenable to making predictions to what the future holds 
in this strategically located country. Whatever the future course of events might be, one 
thing is certain. Iran, an influential oil producer for oil hungry world market, and an 
economic power house in the Persian Gulf, was and is a pivotal country whose actions 
effect not just regional balances but have repercussions well beyond the Persian Gulf. 
 
 
101 Breitbart,’World Powers, Arabs Share Concern on Iran’s Nuclear Program’ (2008) 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=081216195127.wa5m7ros&show_article=1, accessed July 22, 
2011. 
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D. REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS 
Let us now review and analyze the underlying regional ethnic/sectarian issue of 
Shia-Sunni divide which takes strength from the demographic layout of the Shi’a 
population in the region. 
The following interactive map and Table depicts the comparison of percentage of 
Shi’a population vs. the Sunni Muslim population in various countries of the world.102  
 
 
Figure 3.   Interactive Map Illustrating Shia Muslims Distribution in the Middle East 








102 Pew Research Center, ‘Mapping the Global Muslim Population’ (Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life Press, 2009). 
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Iran 66 – 70 M 90–95% 37–40% 
Pakistan 17–26 M 10–15 10–15 
India 16–24 M 10–15 9–14 
Iraq 19 -22 M 65–70 11–12 
Turkey 7–11 M 10–15 4–6 
Yemen 8–10 M 35–40 ~5 
Azerbaijan 5–7 M 65–75 3–4 
Afghanistan 3–4 M 10–15 ~2 
Syria 3–4 M 15–20 ~2 
Saudi Arabia 2–4 M 10–15 1–2 
Nigeria <4 M <5 <2 
Lebanon 1–2 M 45–55 <1 
Tanzania <2 M <10 <1 
Kuwait 500,000–700,000 20–25 <1 
Germany 400,000–600,000 10–15 <1 
Bahrain 400,000–500,000 65–75 <1 
Tajikistan ~400,000 ~7 <1 
United Arab 
Emirates 300,000–400,000 ~10 <1 
United States 200,000–400,000 10–15 <1 
Oman 100,000–300,000 5–10 <1 
United Kingdom 100,000–300,000 10–15 <1 
Bulgaria ~100,000 10–15 <1 
Qatar ~100,000 ~10 <1 
World Total 154–200 M 10–13 100 
Table 3.   Countries with More than 100,000 Shia Muslims (from Pew Research 
Center, 2009).  
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A few things stand out: 
1.  More than a third of Shia Muslims in the world live in Iran with absolute 
 90–95% majority. 
2. Approximately 42% of the remaining world Shi’a population resides in 
countries spanning from India to Turkey. 
3. Highest percentages of Shi’as outside Iran, when compared with the Sunni 
population, live in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. 
4. “Shi’as predominate where there is oil in Iran, Iraq and in the oil rich areas 
of Eastern Saudi Arabia as well,” and “they constitute 80% of the native 
population of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region,” notes Yitzhak Nakash, 
author The Shi’as of Iraq.”103 
The above analysis reveals an undeniable Iranian influence, support or footprint in 
the sociological mindset of countries such as Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon and Yemen who 
have all experienced or are continuing to experience a fair amount of unrest. From 
Bahrain’s perspective, the recent events have clearly drawn up lines between the two 
sects who now view everything through the narrowed down vision of ethnicity. This 
narrow vision has a long history and while we have touched upon this subject in the 
foregoing chapters, it would be worthwhile to refresh our thoughts with some details. 
E. THE UNBRIDGEABLE SUNNI-SHIA CLEAVAGE IN ISLAM: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Recently Bahrain has been experiencing anti-government demonstrations on 
ethnic issues which are primarily related to the age old ideological discord between Shia 
and Sunni schools of Islam. Looking at the history, the seeds of Shia faith in Islam were 
sown soon after the demise of Prophet Muhammad when his successor was required to be 
chosen. This happened because the Prophet had neither appointed a successor nor had 
laid down procedures for choosing one after his death.104 
Notably, the Arab society is based on tribal structure where there is always an 
element of rivalry and tussle for authority and such trends co-existed before and after the 
103 Mike Shuster, “The origins of Shia-Sunni Split,” 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=7332087, accessed April 13, 2011. 
104 Saeed Qureshi, “Bahrain In The Light of Sunni-Shia Conflict: Producing Iran’s Desirable 
Results?,” 2011, http://www.esinislam.com/Articles201102/WritersArticles_SaeedQureshi_0220.htm, 
accessed February 15, 2013 
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advent of Islam. Prophet Muhammad belonged to the Banu Hashim side of Quraish tribe 
but the three caliphs who succeeded him belonged to other tribes yet there was no major 
dispute over their choice, which was limited to a vote from the notables in accordance 
with the tribal practices of those times. This led to the selection of Abu Bakr Siddique as 
his successor. The dissention however came from a small number of loyalists who were 
of the opinion that the succession to the Holy Prophet was an undeniable right of the 
blood relations only and therefore Ali Ibn Abe Talib (Prophet’s cousin, a close confidant 
and son in law) did oppose the choice of the three caliphs on the premise that the Prophet 
during his lifetime had indicated that Ali would be his successor.105 
With the assassination of Othman, the third caliph of Islam, the caliphate was 
ultimately passed to Ali (656 AD). At the same time the Muslims of the Arabian 
Peninsula and the surrounding areas of Syria and Iraq had already been divided in 
supporting the clan of Ali or the family of Prophet, and those who were from other tribes. 
This is evident as the five year period of Ali’s caliphate (656 -661 AD) was largely 
consumed in fighting with the Omayyad governor of Syria, Amir Muawiyah which led to 
thousands of Muslims being killed from both sides.106 The massacre of Prophets Family 
in Karbala by Omayyad caliph Yazid was the proverbial last straw on the camel’s back 
that divided the Muslim nation into two separate blocs. This division is highlighted 
because Sunni’s believe in the four successors of the prophet but the Shias instead 
disregard the first three caliphs and only believe in Ali Ibn Abe Talib as the true 
successor of the Prophet.  
Downstream of the ideological beliefs there are many sub-sects and 
denominations within the two major schools of Islamic thought. Consequently, the 
selection of the true successor resulted in dividing the ranks of Islam. While the Sunnis 
believe in the principle of elective office the Shias continue to emphasize the belief that 
that prophets succession comes only through his blood line. The crux of the Shias faith is 
visualized in the belief that God and his prophet had designated Ali Ibn Abe Talib as the 
105 Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Imara (New York: The Book of Leadership), 1, 4–6. 
106 Ismaili Online, “Ismaili History 336 Ali Bin Abu Talib”, http://www.ismaili.net/histoire/
history03/history336.html (accessed 15 Jan. 2012) 
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only legitimate successor, thereby relegating the rule of the first three prophets as 
illegitimate. This division has witnessed in history the buildup of a mutual mistrust by 
both groups whenever they perceived a chance, and Shias being in minority (around 15% 
of the overall Muslim population) have been at the receiving end. The rift is so 
pronounced (though never stated in loud and clear terms) that each sect does not even 
consider the other as Muslims. History bears witness that Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Iran 
have all been facing the wrath of Sunni-Shia rivalry which continues even to this day and 
countless Muslims from both sides in these areas have laid their life due to the ever 
increasing bigotry and sectarian hatred. Saddam Husain’s dictatorial rule in Iraq (1979 
AD- 2003 AD) over the majority Shia population of Iraq was repressive to say the least. 
However, since May 2006, the tables have turned and the Sunni’s are now at the 
receiving end and being discriminated, at times even tortured by the Shia majority 
government of Nouri al Maliki.107 The American forces, after their occupation of Iraq in 
2003, were unable to stop the buildup of animosity between the two sects and despite a 
flare up against the occupation forces the bloody clashes have continued on daily basis. 
This sectarian vendetta has now spread through Lebanon and even Pakistan where 
hundreds of Shias and Sunni’s have since died as a result of inter sect clashes.108 
F.  RIVAL POLITICAL BLOCS 
Saudi Arabia, the citadel of Sunni faith, and its people are predominantly Sunnis 
and on the other hand 90% of Iran’s population practices Shia faith. As a result there are 
two arch rivals within the Muslim world: one considered as a leader of Sunnis and the 
other leading the Shias. Regrettably this deep rooted ideological rift between Sunni Arabs 
and Shias of Iran has led to the creation of two strong political blocks within the region 
led by Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively, reviving the age old rivalry into modern times. 
It is precisely for this reason that the orthodox regime of Saudi Arabia has quietly 
supported Israel in relation to Iran, the latter being viewed as bigger threat to Arabs’ 
107 Alireza Jafarzadeh, The Iranian Threat (Palgrave MacMillan: New York 2008), 217. 
108 Ibid 
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predominance in the Middle East region.109 So much so that Iran’s recent nuclear 
ambitions and the ensuing controversy have lately made the Saudi King Abdullah to call 
upon United States to ‘crush the snake’s head.’It is therefore difficult to imagine that an 
ideological harmony can be brought about between these sects whose followers are ever 
ready to lay down their lives than compromise on their beliefs. 
Viewed in this historical background Bahrain seems to have become the focal 
point of Shia Sunni rivalry in the region and the Shia uprising from nowhere against the 
Al Khalifa ruling family in February 2011 is a testament to this reality. Iran on its part 
would like to fuel greater polarization and not let this golden opportunity slip through 
without extracting maximum benefit from it in the form of greater leverage and rights for 
Shias that would inevitably lead to weakening of Sunni dominance as well as Saudi 
influence in the region. Reports of unrest and protests from Shia population in the eastern 
provinces of Saudi appear to be a link in the same chain. Whether such major political 
changes would prove detrimental to the American military presence in Bahrain is yet to 
be seen once the protests and riots successfully subside as has happened in Tunisia and 
Egypt. 
G. POIGNANT GROUND REALITIES: DEDUCTIONS  
Based upon above analysis and foregone discussion it would be plausible to 
deduce the following ground realities with regards to Iran and Bahrain’s respective 
positions in the Persian Gulf: 
 
1.  The 1979 AD Islamic Revolution in Iran laid firm foundation of a viable 
 Shi’a theocratic regime that shows no signs of regression in pursuit of 
 uniquely independent and aggressive policies well into the twenty first 
 century.  
2. In consequence, due to its dominant size and Geographic’s and its inherent 
economics strength with fourth largest oil reserves in the world under its 
belt, not to mention its indigenous military prowess with credible nuclear 
ambitions and missile technology, Iran will continue to play a major role 
109 Torgeir E. Fjærtoft, Do Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia heed Sun Tzu?, 
http://gulfunit.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/do-israel-iran-and-saudi-arabia-heed-sun-tzu/ (accessed 22 Dec. 
2011) 
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in shaping the political future of the Persian Gulf region for a long time to 
come. 
3. Other than speculations (and that too mostly by the western ‘democracies’ 
and press) there are no indications to assume that Bahrain’s Sunni led 
government, and the rule of King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa which has full 
backing of GCC, both economically and militarily as has been seen during 
the most recent disturbances on its soil, will be cowed down or capitulate 
as in case of Tunisia and Egypt. The King’s rule will remain broadly 
secure and this is primarily due to the role that Saudi Arabia (the other 
dominant Sunni power house in the region), which sees Bahrain as buffer 
zone, plays and would not like to think about any such precedence to be 
established in its own backyard for the sake of the survival of its own 
Kingdom/ “House of Saud.”  
4. Bahrain’s position is aptly portrayed in a recent report110 by Reuters which 
stated that, “Bahrain is seen as a fault line of tensions between Shi’ite 
power Iran and Sunni Gulf Arab countries wary of protests spreading to 




110Ahlul Bayt News Agency, Bahrain Opposition Threatens to Leave Reform Talks,  
http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=253131, accessed July 16, 2011. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: FUTURE OF BAHRAIN–IRAN RELATIONS, 
THE WAY FORWARD 
As neighbors, Bahrain and Iran have a long relationship centered largely around 
bilateral trade, though basic tourism and necessary regional cooperation also play a part. 
Since the international community and the United States in particular began condemning 
Iran for its secretive nuclear enrichment program, Bahrain’s relations with the Islamic 
Republic have become increasingly strained. This important factor has complicated the 
regional demographics and is viewed in Bahrain with a lot of concern. “While [the 
Iranians] don’t have the bomb yet, they are developing it,” said Sheikh Salman Bin 
Hamad Al-Khalifa, the Bahraini Crown Prince. It remains to be seen how the situation 
pans out in the future.111 
On the economic front Bahrain has a growing but limited trade relationship with 
Iran. Despite Iran’s size and proximity, it is not one of Bahrain’s top-20 trading partners. 
According to published Ministry of Finance figures for 2007 AD, it accounts for less than 
1% of Bahrain’s total trade.112 Bahrain did show a lot of interest in importing Iranian gas, 
(1 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day for next 25 years) but these negotiations have 
not been finalized until to date owing to frictions caused as a result of protests of an 
Iranian official’s claim that Iran had sovereignty over Bahrain, and of late due to the 
Shi’a uprising of February-March 2011 time frame, which has again soured the 
relations.113 It is therefore safe to assume that it would be a while before trade talks can 
resume. Be that as it may the Bahrain-Iran trade relationship primarily consists of 
Bahraini exports of petroleum and mining products and professional and financial 
services. Imports from Iran are minimal and that too largely in food products. 
111 Breitbart, “World Powers, Arabs Share Concern on Iran’s Nuclear Program” (2008) 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=081216195127.wa5m7ros&show_article=1, accessed July 22, 
2011. 
112The Guardian, “U.S Embassy Cables: The Documents,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/
us-embassy-cables-the-documents, accessed July 11, 2011. 
113MENAFN News, “Bahrain to resume gas talks with Iran” (2009), https://www.menafn.com/
qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093278454, accessed July 23, 2011. 
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Bearing all this in mind, and in conclusion to our thesis, we can say that Bahrain’s 
Sunni rulers view Iran with deep suspicion. As far as they are concerned, the secure 
umbrella of GCC, predominant support of Saudi Arabia and the support of United States, 
with its existing military presence on its soil in the shape of fifth fleet, would continue to 
be three key factors that would play important role in keeping Iran’s aggressive policies 
in check. Security being the main concern, Bahrain government is well aware that if Iran 
became embroiled in a regional armed conflict, its (Bahrain’s) indigenous majority Shi’a 
population would be sympathetic and will have a soft corner for Iran, and worryingly 
mindful that the resulting street demonstrations will adversely affect the historical links 
between the two countries. But, it is a dilemma that has firm roots in the centuries old 
conflict of ethnicity and suspicion and to date no one has found a permanent solution to 
bridge this gap. Abdullah Hashim, a Sunni National Unity Assembly spokesman to AFP, 
as reported on Yahoo News and Politics on May 31, 2011, recently remarked, “The call 
to topple the regime [By Shi’a activists] has opened a deep rift in Bahraini society that 
will take tens of years to heal.” 
With this backdrop Bahrain will continue to perform the difficult balancing act 
where diplomacy will play its role as they make occasional gestures to placate their large 
and touchy neighbor; and so, at this point in time, the remark that “Bahrain-Iran relations 
will remain turbulent and continue to ride rough waters well into the 21st century,” seems 
appropriate.  
Both nations therefore need to refer to the age-old axiom: “To exist, one has to 
coexist.” 
There is no choice. 
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